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FIRM LEVEL AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES
FIRM LEVEL AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES
FIRM LEVEL AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES
FIRM LEVEL AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES
FIRM LEVEL AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES
FIRM LEVEL AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES
FIRM LEVEL AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES
FIRM LEVEL AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES
COUNTRY LEVEL MANAGEMENT SCORES*
COUNTRY LEVEL MANAGEMENT SCORES*
COUNTRY LEVEL MANAGEMENT SCORES*
COUNTRY LEVEL MANAGEMENT SCORES*
MANY COMPETITORS AND NO (PG) FAMILY CEO
MANY COMPETITORS AND NO (PG) FAMILY CEO
MANY COMPETITORS AND NO (PG) FAMILY CEO
MANY COMPETITORS AND NO (PG) FAMILY CEO
AGE AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (KERNEL1)
AGE AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (KERNEL1)
MEASURING AND EXPLAINING MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ACROSS FIRMS AND
MEASURING AND EXPLAINING MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ACROSS FIRMS AND
Ppt management

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Ppt management

Ppt management.ppt
1MEASURING AND EXPLAINING MANAGEMENT 28US FIRMS ARE ALSO BETTER IN EUROPE.
PRACTICES ACROSS FIRMS AND COUNTRIES Average management score by firm type in
October 2007 Nick Bloom Stanford & UK, France and Germany*. # in sample.
NBER John Van Reenen LSE & NBER. Domestic. 379. Non-US multinational
2MOTIVATION. Large persistent subsidiary. 44. US multinational
productivity spread across firms and subsidiary. 20. * Controls for any sample
countries: people typically claim this is selection on size (direct and group) and
due to differences in management But listing.
what is the role of management? And why 29OUTLINE. Measuring management
does it vary so much across firms and practices Evaluating the reliability of
countries? this measure Describing management across
3SUMMARY OF THE PAPER (1 of 3). (1) firms & countries Explaining
Measuring Management Develop a survey tool management across firms & countries: -
to measure management practices New data competition - family managed firms.
on 732 firms in US,UK, France & 30Factors we did not find a significant
Germany. Management data: Appears relationship for. Unions: negative but not
consistently measured within firms significant But: (i) sample ? 450 firms;
Correlated with productivity, profits, and (ii) issues over causation Was
Tobins Q, growth & survival Robust to negative and significant for two
measurement error and bias. individual practices: Fixing/firing bad
4SUMMARY OF THE PAPER (2 of 3). (2) performers, Rewarding good performers CEO
Explaining Management Observe big spread Pay: no link in levels but issues over
in management practices (Fig. 2 over) Wide causation Ownership/Governance: positive
cross firm spread (like profits & but insignificant for ownership
productivity) Significant differences concentration and board indepedence
across countries US 1st, Germany 2nd, measures: But sample only UK/US quoted
France 3rd and UK 4th Demonstrate that two firms (? 350) Leverage: nothing with
factors appear significant: Production debt/equity but issues over causation.
market competition positive effect 31Competition & Models of Management
Family managed firms negative effect Practices. Exogenous managerial
Family firm ownership but not management inefficiency positive impact Selection
is fine Family ownership and management models Hopenhayn (1992) or Syverson (2004)
problematic, particularly under primo Optimal choice model ambiguous impact
geniture CEO succession. In contracting models balance between
5FIRM LEVEL AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES. opposing profit and market-size effects
France. n=137. Germany. n=157. UK. n=154. (Raith 2003, Vives 2004).
US. n=290. 32COMPETITION AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
6SUMMARY OF THE PAPER (3 of 3). (3) (TABLE 4). 3 competition proxies from
Quantifying this Effect Competition and Nickell (1996) & Aghion et al. (2005).
family-management important, explains 1 Lerner index = (operating profit
about 50% of firm-level management tail; capital costs)/sales ? rents 2 Includes
and between 1/3 to 2/3 of US-Europe 108 SIC-3 industry, country, firm-size,
management gap: Europe has lower levels of public and interview noise (analyst, time,
competition UK & France also many more date, and manager characteristic)
primo geniture family firms due to Norman controls, = 732 obs 3 S.E.s in ( ) below,
legal origin & tradition. robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered by
7OUTLINE. Why should management country-industry. Competition proxies.
practices vary? Measuring management Dependent variable: Management. Dependent
practices Evaluating the reliability of variable: Management. Dependent variable:
this measure Describing management across Management. Dependent variable:
firms & countries Explaining Management. Dependent variable:
management across firms & countries. Management. Dependent variable:
8Why Should Management Practices Vary? Management. Import penetration (SIC-3
Two models - not mutually exclusive industry, 1995-1999). 0.144 (0.040). 0.156
Optimal choice of management practices (0.084). 1 - Lerner index1 (SIC-3 industry
Another factor of production (like except firm itself, 1995-1999). 1.515
advertising) No better or worse style (0.683). 1.318 (0.637). # of competitors
of management depends on firms (Firm level, 2004). 0.142 (0.051). 0.145
circumstances Exogenous managerial (0.049). Full controls2,3. No. Yes. No.
inefficiency (Mundlak, 1961; Lucas 1978) Yes. No. Yes.
Part of total-factor productivity Strictly 33FAMILY FIRMS & MANAGEMENT AN OLD
better or worse styles of management TOPIC. Alfred Chandler1 and David Landes2
Empirically we find some support for both. both claimed UK & French industrial
9Why should management practices vary? decline relative to US & Germany
Measuring management practices linked to family firms The Britain of the
Evaluating the reliability of this measure late 19th Century basked complacently in
Describing management across firms & the sunset of economic hegemony. Now it
countries Explaining management across was the turn of the 3rd generationand the
firms & countries. weakness of British enterprise reflected
10SOME RELATED LITERATURE - EXAMPLES. their combination of amateurism and
Management, organisation & performance complacency French enterprise was
HRM / Management practices: Ichinowski, family-owned and operated,
Shaw, and Prenushi (1997), Ichinowski and security-orientated rather than
Shaw (1995), Black and Lynch (2001), and risk-taking, technologically conservative
Lazear (2000); Cappelli and Neumark and economically inefficient. 1 Alfred
(2001), Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics
(2004), Organisational practices: of Industrial Capitalism, (1994) 2 David
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) Landes, The Unbound Prometheus:
and Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) Technological Change and Industrial
Individual managers: Bertrand and Schoar Development in Western Europe from 1750 to
(2003). Family firms Empirical: La Porta, the Present, (1969).
Lopez-De-Silanes and Schleifer (1999), 34WE DO FIND GREATER UK & FRENCH
Bertrand et al (2004), Villalonga and Amit FAMILY MANAGEMENT IN OUR DATA (100 YEARS
(2004), Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzales ON), %. UK. Fra. Ger. US. Family1 largest
& Woflenzon (2005), Theory: Burkart, shareholder. 30. 32. 30. 10. Family1
Panunzi and Schleifer (2003), Caselli and largest shareholder and family CEO. 23.
Gennaioli (2005) Economic History: Landes 22. 12. 7. Family1 largest shareholder,
(1969), Chandler (1994), Nicholas (1999). family CEO & primo geniture2. 15. 14.
Productivity dispersion & dynamics 3. 3. 1 Family defined as 2nd generation
Establishments: Baily, Hulten, and or beyond (so not the founder).
Campbell (1992), Bartelsman and Dhrymes Shareholdings combined across all family
(1998), and Jensen, McGuckin and Stiroh members. 2 Based on question: How was
(2001), Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson management of the firm passed down: was it
(2003) Countries: OMahony & Van Ark to the eldest son or by some other way?.
(2004), Caselli (2005). Competition and Non primo geniture alternatives in
firm performance Empirics: Nickell (1996), frequency order: other sons, son in-laws,
Syverson (2004), and Aghion, Bloom, daughters, brothers, wives, nephews and
Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) cousins.
Dynamic theory: Jovanovic (1982) and 35WHY DOES FAMILY INVOLVEMENT VARY
Hopenhayn (1992) Theory: Schmidt (1997), ACROSS COUNTRIES? Historical differences
Raith (2003) and Vives (2004). UK & French tradition of Primo
11STEPS TO TRY TO MEASURE MANAGEMENT. 1) Geniture: [Oxford English Dictionary,
Developing management practice scoring 2005] Feudal rule of inheritance
Scorecard for 18 monitoring, targets and introduced into England by the Norman
incentives practices 45 minute phone Conquest. Replaced Teutonic gavelkind.
interview of (manufacturing plant) Obligatory until the Statute of Wills
managers 2) Obtaining unbiased responses [1540]. Still common in many places US
Double-blind Interviewers do not know and German tradition of equal division
company performance Managers are not (Menchik, 1980) Estate tax headline
informed (in advance) they are scored 3) rates1: on family firms US ? 50% France ?
Getting firms to participate in the 25% UK = 0% Germany ? 15%. 1 Rate on a
interview Introduced as $25m firm. In practice these taxes are
Lean-manufacturing interview, no often reduced/avoided by advanced tax
financials Endorsement of Bundesbank ,UK planning, although this involves
Treasury, Banque de France Run by 10 MBAs foresight, financial costs and some
(loud, assertive & business control loss.
experience). 36FAMILY FIRMS AND MODELS OF MANAGEMENT
12MONITORING - i.e. HOW IS PERFORMANCE PRACTICES. Likely family impact depends on
TRACKED?. Score. (1): Measures tracked do involvement Ownership but not management
not indicate directly if overall business probably positive Concentrated ownership
objectives are being met. Certain so better monitoring Management probably
processes arent tracked at all. (3): Most negative Smaller pool to select CEO from
key performance indicators are tracked Possible Carnegie effect on future CEOs
formally. Tracking is overseen by senior Both effects will be worse with primo
management. (5): Performance is geniture (succession of eldest son to CEO
continuously tracked and communicated, position).
both formally and informally, to all staff 37FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND FAMILY MANAGEMENT
using a range of visual management tools. (TABLE 5). %. Dependent variable:
Note: All 18 dimensions and over 50 Management. Dependent variable:
examples in Bloom & VanReenen (2006). Management. Dependent variable:
13ADDITIONAL CONTROLS FOR BIAS & Management. Dependent variable:
NOISE. 8 INTERVIEWEE CONTROLS Gender, Management. Family1 largest shareholder.
seniority, tenure in post, tenure in firm, -0.029 (0.094). 0.304 (0.166). Family1
countries worked in, foreign, worked in largest shareholder & family CEO.
US, plant location, reliability score 3 -0.100 (0.078). -0.175 (0.188). Family1
INTERVIEWER CONTROLS Set of analyst largest shareholder, family CEO &
dummies, cumulative interviews run, prior primo geniture. -0.281 (0.097). -0.382
firm contacts 5 TIME CONTROLS Day of the (0.128. Observations2. 732. 732. 732. 732.
week, time of day (interviewer), time of 1 Family defined as 2nd generation or
the day (interviewee), duration of later 2 Note includes SIC-3 digit,
interview, days from project start. country, skills, firm size, firm age &
14MANAGEMENT SURVEY SAMPLE. US (290), public controls.
UK, France and Germany (?150 each) Medium 38QUANTIFYING THESE EFFECTS: ACROSS
sized manufacturers (100 - 10,000 FIRMS ACROSS COUNTRIES.
employees, median ? 600) Medium sized 39MANY COMPETITORS AND NO (PG) FAMILY
because firm practices more homogeneous CEO. FEW COMPETITORS AND/OR (PG) FAMILY
Manufacturing as easier to measure CEO. 9.0% firms in tail1. N=317. 2.7%
productivity Obtained 54% coverage rate firms in tail1. N=415. 1 Tail defined as a
from sampling frame Response rates score ? 2. In the whole sample 6.9% of
uncorrelated with performance measures. firms are in the tail. Sample splits
15ADDITIONAL MATCHED DATA WE COLLECTED. significantly different at 5%, but not if
HR Survey Skills, demographics, hours, exclude firms with score ? 2.
organisational characteristics, number of 40ACCOUNTING FOR THE CROSS-COUNTRY
competitors etc. Ownership & Family SCORES. Dependent variable. Management.
Survey Shareholders & managerial Management. Management. Management.
characteristics, family involvement, Management. Country is US. Baseline.
family progression rules etc. Performance Baseline. Baseline. Baseline. Baseline.
Data Separately match company accounts - Country is Germany. -0.045 (0.064). -0.081
so collect management and performance data (0.075). -0.090 (0.075). -0.051 (0.074).
from completely different sources Industry 0.010 (0.076). Country is France. -0.202
and Trade Data OECD. (0.086). -0.183 (0.104). -0. 131 (0.103).
16Why should management practices vary? -0.075 (0.102). -0.028 (0.102). Country is
Measuring management practices UK. -0.276 (0.078). -0.276 (0.093). -0.227
Evaluating the reliability of this measure (0.091). -0.199 (0.091). -0.126 (0.079).
Internal/External validation Contingency Family owned, family CEO & primo
Measurement error/bias Describing geniture. -0.638 (0.101). -0.628 (0.100).
management across firms & countries -0.584 (0.098). # of competitors. 0.142
Explaining management across firms & (0.052). 0.161 (0.051). Ln (% employees
countries. with a degree). 0.145 (0.037). Public
17INTERVAL VALIDATION OF THE SCORING. & size controls. No. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Re-interviewed 64 firms with different Yes. Observations. 732. 732. 732. 732.
interviewers and managers. Firm average 732. 1 OLS on 732 observations. S.E.s in (
scores (over 18 question). Firm-level ) robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
average correlation of 0.759. 2nd 41TO SUMMARIZE. Original methodology for
interview. 1st interview. measuring management Product market
18EXTERNAL VALIDATION OF THE SCORING. competition & family management
Performance measure. country c. management important Explain 50% of tail of badly
(average z-scores). ln(capital). other managed firms Explain 2/3 of US-France gap
controls. ln(labor). ln(materials). Use up & 1/3 of US-UK gap Last summer ran
to 11 years of accounting data for 3500 firm survey on firms in Europe, US
1994-2004. Note not a causal estimation, and Asia covering management and
only an association. organisational structure Research design
19EXTERNAL VALIDATION: PRODUCTIVITY very flexible so any suggestions welcome
& PROFIT. Dependent variable. Sales Quotes:
(in Ln). Sales (in Ln). Sales (in Ln). 42BACK-UP.
ROCE. Tobin Q (in Ln). Sales growth. Exit. 43MY FAVOURITE QUOTES: The British
Estimation1. OLS. OLS. OLS. OLS. OLS. OLS. Chat-Up. [Male manager speaking to an
Probit. Firms. All. All. All. All. Quoted. Australian female interviewer] Production
All. All. Managementi. 0.085 (0.025). Manager: Your accent is really cute and I
0.034 (0.011). 0.042 (0.012). 2.469 love the way you talk. Do you fancy
(0.688). 0.250 (0.075)-. 0.018 (0.006). meeting up near the factory? Interviewer
-0.200 [0.026]. Ln(Labor) it. 0.999 Sorry, but Im washing my hair every
(0.014). 0.539 (0.021). 0.540 (0.021). night for the next month..
2.172 (1.202). 0.209 (0.109). -0.022 44MY FAVOURITE QUOTES: The difficulties
(0.011). 0.233 [0.045]. Ln(Capital) it. of defining ownership in Europe.
0.103 (0.013). 0.104 (0.013). -0.148 Production Manager: Were owned by the
(0.899). -0.029 (0.086). 0.024 (0.008). Mafia Interviewer: I think thats the
-0.158 [0.045]. Ln(Materials) it. 0.362 Other category..although I guess I
(0.020). 0.354 (0.020). -0.439 (0.723). could put you down as an Italian
0.130 (0.050). -0.010 (0.007). -0.084 multinational ?. Americans on geography.
[0.231]. Controls1. No. Yes. Yes. Yes. Interviewer: How many production sites do
Yes. Yes. Yes. Noise controls. No. No. you have abroad? Manager in Indiana, US:
Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Observations. Wellwe have one in Texas.
6,267. 5,350. 5,350. 5,089. 2,635. 4,777. 45MY FAVOURITE QUOTES: The bizarre.
709. Firms. 732. 709. 709. 690. 374. 702. Interviewer: [long silence]hello,
709. 1 Includes country, year, SIC3 hello.are you still there.hello
industry, skills, hours, firm-age, and Production Manager: .Im sorry, I just
public/private Robust S.E.s in ( ) below. got distracted by a submarine surfacing in
For probit p-values in [ ] below. front of my window. The unbelievable.
20EXTERNAL VALIDATION ROBUSTNESS. [Male manager speaking to a female
Productivity correlations robust to type interviewer] Production Manager: I would
of TFP estimation OLS, Olley-Pakes, GMM like you to call me Daddy when we talk
& Within-Groups Results also [End of interview].
significant in most recent cross-section 46INCENTIVES - i.e. HOW DOES THE
(2003/04) Results significant in both PROMOTION SYSTEM WORK?. Score. (1) People
Anglo-Saxon (US and UK) and European are promoted primarily upon the basis of
(France and Germany) country subsets. tenure. (3) People are promoted upon the
21CONTINGENT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES. basis of performance. (5) We actively
Dependent Var. HC Management. FC identify, develop and promote our top
Management. HC-FC Management. HC-FC performers. Note: All 18 dimensions and
Management. HC-FC Manage ment. Level. over 50 examples in Bloom & VanReenen
Firm. Firm. Firm. Firm. Industry. Ln (% (2006).
degrees)i firm level. 0.220 (0.039). 0.100 47TARGETS - i.e. HOW TOUGH ARE
(0.043). 0.120 (0.043). Ln (ave wage)i TARGETS?. Score. (1) Goals are either too
firm level. 0.337 (0.122). Ln (% degrees)j easy or impossible to achieve; managers
Industry level (US). 0.281 (0.169). low-ball estimates to ensure easy goals.
Standard Errors. Robust. Robust. Robust. (3) In most areas, top management pushes
Robust. Clustered. Firms. 732. 732. 732. for aggressive goals based on solid
424. 732. Note: HC management average economic rationale. There are a few
z-score of the 3 most human capital "sacred cows" not held to the
focused questions (questions 13, 17 and same rigorous standard. (5) Goals are
18). FC management average z-score of genuinely demanding for all divisions.
the 3 most fixed capital focused questions They are grounded in solid, solid economic
(1, 2 and 4). HC-PC management is the rational. Note: All 18 dimensions and over
difference of these two measures. 50 examples in Bloom & VanReenen
22CONCERNS WITH OUR MANAGEMENT MEASURE? (2006).
Three potential issues: 1) Measurement 48I.V. MANAGEMENT IN PRODUCTION
error (classical), but Attenuation FUNCTION. Dependent Var. Ln (Sales). Ln
downwardly biases our results We try to (Sales). Ln (Sales). Ln (Sales). Ln
control for this with Noise controls (Sales). Estimation1. Reduced form, OLS.
(management & interview Reduced form, OLS. Reduced form, OLS.
characteristics). Full, OLS. Full, IV. Management. 0.042
23CONCERNS WITH OUR MANAGEMENT MEASURE? (0.012). 0.216 (0.097). Competition
(2) Firm performance-related measurement (Import penetr.). 0.089 (0.032). 0.088
bias in management score (i.e. the happy (0.032). Family CEO & primo geniture.
manager problem), but Surveying -0.060 (0.030). -0.058 (0.030).
methodology using examples tries to Instruments (F-test). Imports,Family
minimize this Competition and management (20.79). Over-identifying restriction
positively linked (later) (p-val). 0.520. % 75:25 TFP gap accounted
Management-performance link is as for. 12%. 63%. 1 Other variables include
important in France & Germany (where log(Labor), log(Capital), log(Materials),
managers less likely to talk up country, year, SIC3 industry, skills,
Anglo-Saxon practices) as it is in UK hours, firm-age, and public/private. All
& US No link between past productivity 709 observations S.E.s in ( ) below,
growth & management Not all questions robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
significant (and not linked to 49AGE AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
subjectivity) Other subjective questions (KERNEL1). Management score. 10 years. 75
insignificant i.e. feel-good work-life years. Firm age (in logs). 1 Point-wise
balance questions, organisational confidence intervals (in feint) generated
devolvement questions So potential problem from 1000 bootstraps.
but no evidence that major phenomenon. 50
24CONCERNS WITH OUR MANAGEMENT RESULTS? 51FAMILY OWNERSHIP PROBIT. 1 Marginal
(3) Reverse causality (management effects, p-values in [ ] brackets
correctly measured but better firm underneath. Dependent variable. Family
performance causes better management), Yes owned, family CEO & primo geniture1.
but main point of performance Country = UK. 0.109 [0.015]. Country =
estimations is external validity of the France. 0. 096 [0.042]. Country = Germany.
measure Also note that if interpretation 0.058 [0.303]. Log (employees). -0.022
is effect of management on productivity [0.012]. Log (firm-age). 0.052 [0.017].
note that the bias is ambiguous. Industry controls. Yes. Observations. 718.
25OUTLINE. Measuring management 52SOME LIMITED EVIDENCE FOR EFFORT
practices Evaluating the reliability of EFFECTS? Dependent variable. Managerial
this measure Describing management across Hours Worked. Managerial Hours Worked.
firms & countries Explaining Managerial Hours Worked. Managerial Hours
management across firms & countries: - Worked. Managerial Hours Worked.
competition - family managed firms. Managerial Hours Worked. Lerner index
26FIRM LEVEL AVERAGE MANAGEMENT SCORES. (5-yr lagged). 6.660 (4.129). 1.809
France. n=137. Germany. n=157. UK. n=154. (5.869). Import penetration (5-yr lagged).
US. n=290. -0.230 (0.444). 1.082 (0.948). Number of
27COUNTRY LEVEL MANAGEMENT SCORES*. US. competitors. 1.155 (0.509). 0.935 (0.623).
Germany. France. UK. Typical UK managers? Firms. 727. 727. 733. 733. 733. 733.
Bad manufacturing management - a UK Observations. 727. 727. 733. 733. 733.
tradition? Efficient management is the 733. Full controls*. No. Yes. No. Yes. No.
single most significant factor in the Yes. *Includes 108 SIC-3 digit dummies,
American productivity advantage [Marshall country dummies, firm size and type S.E.s
Plan Anglo-American productivity mission, robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity,
1947]. clustered by country-industry.
Ppt management.ppt
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Ppt management

Ppt management

English speaking countries - MUSIC, WHISKEY, BUTTER, HORSES. IRISH. FARMING. English-speaking countries. Ireland. WELCOME TO IRELAND! Great Britain. Listening-Reading-Speaking-Test. Ireland: PATRICK`S CATHEDRAL. WHAT IS THE MAIN PLACE OF INTEREST IN NORTHERN IRELAND? THE IRISH SEA. WHAT ARE THE LEADING IRISH INDUSTRIES? SHIPBUILDING.

31 october halloween - Happy Halloween. In the United States children wear costumes and masks and go trick-or-treating. . - , 31 . Halloween is a festival that takes place on October 31. Many of them carve jack-o-lantens out of pumpkins.

The english-speaking countries - Australia. Scotland. Disneyland. Great Britain. USA. The English-speaking countries.

The english-speaking countries - USA. Scotland. Disneyland. The English-speaking countries. Australia. Great Britain.

English-speaking countries quiz - Who were the two brothers who invented the airplane. Home-reading characters. Mountain. Monument in Washington. Literature. American women. Home Library-writers. Name the five great lakes. Novel Gone with the Wind. State. Questions. English speaking countries. London sights. Government. Flags. American.

Babylon - Wonderful and marble statues.Each figurine set so that the viewer always met her gaze. Characteristic features of these figurines were fine attention to detail, more realism. For the Babylonian art was a picture of the typical animals - usually a lion and a bull. All that remains of the original ancient famed city of Babylon today is a large mound, or tell, of broken mud-brick buildings and debris in the fertile Mesopotamian plain between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

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