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Role-Based Access Control
Role-Based Access Control
Access Control Models: A perspective
Access Control Models: A perspective
Access Matrix Model (Lampson 1971)
Access Matrix Model (Lampson 1971)
Access Matrix Model
Access Matrix Model
MAC, DAC and RBAC
MAC, DAC and RBAC
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Beyond DAC and MAC
Beyond DAC and MAC
Role-Based Access Control: The RBAC96 Model
Role-Based Access Control: The RBAC96 Model
ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)
ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)
Central concept of RBAC
Central concept of RBAC
WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC
WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC
RBAC SECURITY PRINCIPLES
RBAC SECURITY PRINCIPLES
RBAC96 IEEE Computer Feb
RBAC96 IEEE Computer Feb
WHAT IS RBAC
WHAT IS RBAC
RBAC CONUNDRUM
RBAC CONUNDRUM
RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS
RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS
RBAC0
RBAC0
PERMISSIONS
PERMISSIONS
PERMISSIONS
PERMISSIONS
PERMISSIONS
PERMISSIONS
ROLES AS POLICY
ROLES AS POLICY
ROLES VERSUS GROUPS
ROLES VERSUS GROUPS
USERS
USERS
USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT
USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT
SESSIONS
SESSIONS
PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT
PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT
MANAGEMENT OF RBAC
MANAGEMENT OF RBAC
RBAC1
RBAC1
HIERARCHICAL ROLES
HIERARCHICAL ROLES
HIERARCHICAL ROLES
HIERARCHICAL ROLES
PRIVATE ROLES
PRIVATE ROLES
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY
RBAC3
RBAC3
CONSTRAINTS
CONSTRAINTS
CONSTRAINTS
CONSTRAINTS
CONSTRAINTS
CONSTRAINTS
CONSTRAINTS
CONSTRAINTS
The NIST-ANSI and (hopefully) soon-to-be ISO RBAC Standard Model
The NIST-ANSI and (hopefully) soon-to-be ISO RBAC Standard Model
The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model
The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model
RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS
RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS
The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model
The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model
The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model
The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model
Core RBAC
Core RBAC
Core RBAC: Administrative Functions
Core RBAC: Administrative Functions
Core RBAC: Supporting System Functions
Core RBAC: Supporting System Functions
Core RBAC: Review Functions
Core RBAC: Review Functions
Hierarchical RBAC
Hierarchical RBAC
Limited Hierarchies
Limited Hierarchies
Limited Hierarchies
Limited Hierarchies
General Hierarchies
General Hierarchies
Inheritance versus Activation Hierarchy
Inheritance versus Activation Hierarchy
Inheritance versus Activation Hierarchy
Inheritance versus Activation Hierarchy
Constrained RBAC: Static Separation of Duties
Constrained RBAC: Static Separation of Duties
Constrained RBAC: Dynamic Separation of Duties
Constrained RBAC: Dynamic Separation of Duties
MAC and DAC in RBAC
MAC and DAC in RBAC
MAC
MAC
+
+
MAC in RBAC96
MAC in RBAC96
DAC in RBAC96
DAC in RBAC96
MAC and DAC in the NIST-ANSI-ISO Model
MAC and DAC in the NIST-ANSI-ISO Model
Administrative RBAC: ARBAC97
Administrative RBAC: ARBAC97
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY
EXAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE HIERARCHY
EXAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE HIERARCHY
URA97 GRANT MODEL: can-assign
URA97 GRANT MODEL: can-assign
URA97 GRANT MODEL
URA97 GRANT MODEL
URA97 REVOKE MODEL
URA97 REVOKE MODEL
URA97 REVOKE MODEL
URA97 REVOKE MODEL
URA97 REVOKE MODEL : can-revoke
URA97 REVOKE MODEL : can-revoke
PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT
PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT
ARole Prereq Cond Role Range PSO1 PL1 [E1,PL1) PSO2 PL2 [E2,PL2) DSO
ARole Prereq Cond Role Range PSO1 PL1 [E1,PL1) PSO2 PL2 [E2,PL2) DSO
ARole Role Range PSO1 [E1,PL1] PSO2 [E2,PL2] DSO (ED,DIR) SSO [ED,DIR]
ARole Role Range PSO1 [E1,PL1] PSO2 [E2,PL2] DSO (ED,DIR) SSO [ED,DIR]
OM-AM and RBAC
OM-AM and RBAC
THE OM-AM WAY
THE OM-AM WAY
LAYERS AND LAYERS
LAYERS AND LAYERS
OM-AM AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC)
OM-AM AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC)
OM-AM AND DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC)
OM-AM AND DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC)
OM-AM AND ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)
OM-AM AND ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)
Server-Pull Architecture
Server-Pull Architecture
User-Pull Architecture
User-Pull Architecture
Proxy-Based Architecture
Proxy-Based Architecture
RBAC Mechanisms
RBAC Mechanisms
Other RBAC Research and Results
Other RBAC Research and Results
RBAC Research (dates are approximate)
RBAC Research (dates are approximate)
Ongoing and Future Work in RBAC
Ongoing and Future Work in RBAC
Research Challenges
Research Challenges

Презентация: «Role-Based Access Control». Автор: Valued Gateway Client. Файл: «Role-Based Access Control.ppt». Размер zip-архива: 464 КБ.

Role-Based Access Control

содержание презентации «Role-Based Access Control.ppt»
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1 Role-Based Access Control

Role-Based Access Control

Prof. Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason University www.list.gmu.edu sandhu@gmu.edu

2 Access Control Models: A perspective

Access Control Models: A perspective

3 Access Matrix Model (Lampson 1971)

Access Matrix Model (Lampson 1971)

Objects (and Subjects)

G

F

S u b j e c t s

r

r w

U

rights

r w

V

3

4 Access Matrix Model

Access Matrix Model

Separates authentication from authorization Rights are persistent These items have come into question in recent times, but that is a topic for another talk. Separates model from implementation Policy versus mechanism This separation continues to be valuable and will be discussed and refined later in this talk.

4

5 MAC, DAC and RBAC

MAC, DAC and RBAC

For 25 years (1971-96) access control was divided into Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Since the early-mid 1990’s Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) has become a dominant force RBAC subsumes MAC and DAC RBAC is not the “final” answer BUT is a critical piece of the “final” answer

5

6 Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

TS

S

Lattice of security labels

C

Information Flow

Dominance

U

Rights are determined by security labels (Bell-LaPadula 1971)

6

7 Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

Objects (and Subjects)

G

F

S u b j e c t s

r

r w

U

r w

V

security label of F must dominate or equal security label of G

7

8 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

The owner of a resource determines access to that resource The owner is often the creator of the resource Fails to distinguish read from copy This distinction has re-emerged recently under the name Dissemination Control (DCON)

8

9 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

Objects (and Subjects)

G

F

S u b j e c t s

r

r w

U

r w

V

9

10 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

Objects (and Subjects)

G

F

r w own

S u b j e c t s

r

U

r w own

V

Rights are determined by the owners

10

11 Beyond DAC and MAC

Beyond DAC and MAC

Many attempts were made Domain-Type enforcement (Boebert-Kain 1985) Clark-Wilson (1987) Chinese Walls (Brewer-Nash 1989) Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman (1976) Schematic Protection Model (Sandhu 1985) Typed Access Matrix Model (Sandhu 1992) ………………… RBAC solves this problem

11

12 Role-Based Access Control: The RBAC96 Model

Role-Based Access Control: The RBAC96 Model

Ravi Sandhu, Edward Coyne, Hal Feinstein and Charles Youman, “Role-Based Access Control Models.” IEEE Computer, Volume 29, Number 2, February 1996, pages 38-47.

13 ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)

ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)

A user’s permissions are determined by the user’s roles rather than identity or clearance roles can encode arbitrary attributes multi-faceted ranges from very simple to very sophisticated

13

14 Central concept of RBAC

Central concept of RBAC

USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

USERS

ROLES

PERMISSIONS

14

15 WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC

WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC

RBAC is a framework to help in articulating policy The main point of RBAC is to facilitate security management

15

16 RBAC SECURITY PRINCIPLES

RBAC SECURITY PRINCIPLES

least privilege separation of duties separation of administration and access abstract operations

16

17 RBAC96 IEEE Computer Feb

RBAC96 IEEE Computer Feb

1996

Policy neutral can be configured to do MAC roles simulate clearances (ESORICS 96) can be configured to do DAC roles simulate identity (RBAC98)

17

18 WHAT IS RBAC

WHAT IS RBAC

multidimensional open ended ranges from simple to sophisticated

18

19 RBAC CONUNDRUM

RBAC CONUNDRUM

turn on all roles all the time turn on one role only at a time turn on a user-specified subset of roles

19

20 RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS

RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS

RBAC3 ROLE HIERARCHIES + CONSTRAINTS

RBAC0 BASIC RBAC

20

21 RBAC0

RBAC0

21

22 PERMISSIONS

PERMISSIONS

Primitive permissions read, write, append, execute Abstract permissions credit, debit, inquiry

22

23 PERMISSIONS

PERMISSIONS

System permissions Auditor Object permissions read, write, append, execute, credit, debit, inquiry

23

24 PERMISSIONS

PERMISSIONS

Permissions are positive No negative permissions or denials negative permissions and denials can be handled by constraints No duties or obligations outside scope of access control

24

25 ROLES AS POLICY

ROLES AS POLICY

A role brings together a collection of users and a collection of permissions These collections will vary over time A role has significance and meaning beyond the particular users and permissions brought together at any moment

25

26 ROLES VERSUS GROUPS

ROLES VERSUS GROUPS

Groups are often defined as a collection of users A role is a collection of users and a collection of permissions Some authors define role as a collection of permissions

26

27 USERS

USERS

Users are human beings or other active agents Each individual should be known as exactly one user

27

28 USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

A user can be a member of many roles Each role can have many users as members

28

29 SESSIONS

SESSIONS

A user can invoke multiple sessions In each session a user can invoke any subset of roles that the user is a member of

29

30 PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

A permission can be assigned to many roles Each role can have many permissions

30

31 MANAGEMENT OF RBAC

MANAGEMENT OF RBAC

Option 1: USER-ROLE-ASSIGNMENT and PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT can be changed only by the chief security officer Option 2: Use RBAC to manage RBAC

31

32 RBAC1

RBAC1

ROLE HIERARCHIES

USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

USERS

ROLES

PERMISSIONS

SESSIONS

32

33 HIERARCHICAL ROLES

HIERARCHICAL ROLES

Primary-Care Physician

Specialist Physician

Physician

Health-Care Provider

33

34 HIERARCHICAL ROLES

HIERARCHICAL ROLES

34

35 PRIVATE ROLES

PRIVATE ROLES

35

36 EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

PROJECT 1

PROJECT 2

Director (DIR)

Project Lead 1 (PL1)

Project Lead 2 (PL2)

Production 1 (P1)

Quality 1 (Q1)

Production 2 (P2)

Quality 2 (Q2)

Engineer 1 (E1)

Engineer 2 (E2)

Engineering Department (ED)

Employee (E)

36

37 EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

PROJECT 1

PROJECT 2

Project Lead 1 (PL1)

Project Lead 2 (PL2)

Production 1 (P1)

Quality 1 (Q1)

Production 2 (P2)

Quality 2 (Q2)

Engineer 1 (E1)

Engineer 2 (E2)

Engineering Department (ED)

Employee (E)

37

38 EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

PROJECT 1

PROJECT 2

Director (DIR)

Project Lead 1 (PL1)

Project Lead 2 (PL2)

Production 1 (P1)

Quality 1 (Q1)

Production 2 (P2)

Quality 2 (Q2)

Engineer 1 (E1)

Engineer 2 (E2)

38

39 EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

PROJECT 1

PROJECT 2

Project Lead 1 (PL1)

Project Lead 2 (PL2)

Production 1 (P1)

Quality 1 (Q1)

Production 2 (P2)

Quality 2 (Q2)

Engineer 1 (E1)

Engineer 2 (E2)

39

40 RBAC3

RBAC3

ROLE HIERARCHIES

USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

PERMISSIONS-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

USERS

ROLES

PERMISSIONS

CONSTRAINTS

SESSIONS

40

41 CONSTRAINTS

CONSTRAINTS

Mutually Exclusive Roles Static Exclusion: The same individual can never hold both roles Dynamic Exclusion: The same individual can never hold both roles in the same context

41

42 CONSTRAINTS

CONSTRAINTS

Mutually Exclusive Permissions Static Exclusion: The same role should never be assigned both permissions Dynamic Exclusion: The same role can never hold both permissions in the same context

42

43 CONSTRAINTS

CONSTRAINTS

Cardinality Constraints on User-Role Assignment At most k users can belong to the role At least k users must belong to the role Exactly k users must belong to the role

43

44 CONSTRAINTS

CONSTRAINTS

Cardinality Constraints on Permissions-Role Assignment At most k roles can get the permission At least k roles must get the permission Exactly k roles must get the permission

44

45 The NIST-ANSI and (hopefully) soon-to-be ISO RBAC Standard Model

The NIST-ANSI and (hopefully) soon-to-be ISO RBAC Standard Model

David F. Ferraiolo, Ravi Sandhu, Serban Gavrila, D. Richard Kuhn and Ramaswamy Chandramouli. “Proposed NIST Standard for Role-Based Access Control.” ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Volume 4, Number 3, August 2001, pages 224-274.

46 The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model

The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model

Adds much needed detail and consensus agreement to the RBAC96 model and other contemporary models Focuses on areas where consensus agreement exists and commercial implementations have been demonstrated Leaves many important areas for future work Eventual goal is much more ambitious Test suite for conformance testing

46

47 RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS

RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS

RBAC3 ROLE HIERARCHIES + CONSTRAINTS

RBAC0 BASIC RBAC

47

48 The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model

The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model

48

49 The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model

The NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC Model

Additional details Administrative Functions Supporting System Functions Review Functions

49

50 Core RBAC

Core RBAC

50

51 Core RBAC: Administrative Functions

Core RBAC: Administrative Functions

AddUser DeleteUser AddRole DeleteRole AssignUser DeassignUser Grant-Permission Revoke-Permission

51

52 Core RBAC: Supporting System Functions

Core RBAC: Supporting System Functions

CreateSession AddActiveRole DropActiveRole CheckAccess

52

53 Core RBAC: Review Functions

Core RBAC: Review Functions

Required AssignedUsers AssignedRoles Optional RolePermissions UserPermissions SessionRoles SessionPermissions RoleOperationsOnObject SessionOperationsOnObject

53

54 Hierarchical RBAC

Hierarchical RBAC

54

55 Limited Hierarchies

Limited Hierarchies

55

56 Limited Hierarchies

Limited Hierarchies

56

57 General Hierarchies

General Hierarchies

57

58 Inheritance versus Activation Hierarchy

Inheritance versus Activation Hierarchy

58

59 Inheritance versus Activation Hierarchy

Inheritance versus Activation Hierarchy

Inheritance hierarchy Activating Director Role also activates all junior roles (by inheritance of permissions) Violates least privilege Activation hierarchy Activating Director Role does not activate junior roles (there is no inheritance of permissions) Junior roles must be explicitly activated Preserves least privilege but is less automated

59

60 Constrained RBAC: Static Separation of Duties

Constrained RBAC: Static Separation of Duties

60

61 Constrained RBAC: Dynamic Separation of Duties

Constrained RBAC: Dynamic Separation of Duties

61

62 MAC and DAC in RBAC

MAC and DAC in RBAC

Sylvia Osborn, Ravi Sandhu and Qamar Munawer. “Configuring Role-Based Access Control to Enforce Mandatory and Discretionary Access Control Policies.” ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Volume 3, Number 2, May 2000, pages 85-106.

63 MAC

MAC

Read

Write

63

64 +

+

-

MAC in RBAC96

M1W

M2W

Read Write

64

65 MAC in RBAC96

MAC in RBAC96

user ? xR, user has clearance x user ? LW, independent of clearance Need constraints session ? xR iff session ? xW in a session exactly one read role must be activated, and this cannot be changed read can be assigned only to xR roles write can be assigned only to xW roles (O,read) assigned to xR iff (O,write) assigned to xW

65

66 DAC in RBAC96

DAC in RBAC96

Construction is more complex Requires multiple roles for every object Revocation Grant-dependent revocation is harder to handle Grant-independent revocation is easier to handle

66

67 MAC and DAC in the NIST-ANSI-ISO Model

MAC and DAC in the NIST-ANSI-ISO Model

RBAC96 constructions use cardinality constraints in addition to Static and Dynamic separation of duties These constructions are not applicable to NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC model Can NIST-ANSI-ISO RBAC model do MAC and DAC? With extensions: yes Without extensions: probably not

67

68 Administrative RBAC: ARBAC97

Administrative RBAC: ARBAC97

Ravi Sandhu, Venkata Bhamidipati and Qamar Munawer. “The ARBAC97 Model for Role-Based Administration of Roles.” ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Volume 2, Number 1, February 1999, pages 105-135.

69 EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

PROJECT 1

PROJECT 2

Director (DIR)

Project Lead 1 (PL1)

Project Lead 2 (PL2)

Production 1 (P1)

Quality 1 (Q1)

Production 2 (P2)

Quality 2 (Q2)

Engineer 1 (E1)

Engineer 2 (E2)

Engineering Department (ED)

Employee (E)

70 EXAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE HIERARCHY

EXAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE HIERARCHY

Senior Security Officer (SSO)

Department Security Officer (DSO)

Project Security Officer 1 (PSO1)

Project Security Officer 2 (PSO2)

71 URA97 GRANT MODEL: can-assign

URA97 GRANT MODEL: can-assign

ARole Prereq Role Role Range PSO1 ED [E1,PL1) PSO2 ED [E2,PL2) DSO ED (ED,DIR) SSO E [ED,ED] SSO ED (ED,DIR]

71

72 URA97 GRANT MODEL

URA97 GRANT MODEL

“redundant” assignments to senior and junior roles are allowed are useful

72

73 URA97 REVOKE MODEL

URA97 REVOKE MODEL

WEAK REVOCATION revokes explicit membership in a role independent of who did the assignment

73

74 URA97 REVOKE MODEL

URA97 REVOKE MODEL

STRONG REVOCATION revokes explicit membership in a role and its seniors authorized only if corresponding weak revokes are authorized alternatives all-or-nothing revoke within range

74

75 URA97 REVOKE MODEL : can-revoke

URA97 REVOKE MODEL : can-revoke

ARole Role Range PSO1 [E1,PL1) PSO2 [E2,PL2) DSO (ED,DIR) SSO [ED,DIR]

75

76 PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

dual of user-role assignment can-assign-permission can-revoke-permission weak revoke strong revoke (propagates down)

76

77 ARole Prereq Cond Role Range PSO1 PL1 [E1,PL1) PSO2 PL2 [E2,PL2) DSO

ARole Prereq Cond Role Range PSO1 PL1 [E1,PL1) PSO2 PL2 [E2,PL2) DSO

E1 ? E2 [ED,ED] SSO PL1 ? PL2 [ED,ED] SSO ED [E,E]

PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT CAN-ASSIGN-PERMISSION

77

78 ARole Role Range PSO1 [E1,PL1] PSO2 [E2,PL2] DSO (ED,DIR) SSO [ED,DIR]

ARole Role Range PSO1 [E1,PL1] PSO2 [E2,PL2] DSO (ED,DIR) SSO [ED,DIR]

PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT CAN-REVOKE-PERMISSION

78

79 OM-AM and RBAC

OM-AM and RBAC

80 THE OM-AM WAY

THE OM-AM WAY

A s s u r a n c e

What?

Objectives Model Architecture Mechanism

How?

80

81 LAYERS AND LAYERS

LAYERS AND LAYERS

Multics rings Layered abstractions Waterfall model Network protocol stacks Napolean layers RoFi layers OM-AM etcetera

81

82 OM-AM AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC)

OM-AM AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC)

A s s u r a n c e

No information leakage Lattices (Bell-LaPadula) Security kernel Security labels

82

83 OM-AM AND DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC)

OM-AM AND DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC)

A s s u r a n c e

Owner-based discretion numerous numerous ACLs, Capabilities, etc

83

84 OM-AM AND ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)

OM-AM AND ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)

A s s u r a n c e

Objective neutral RBAC96, ARBAC97, etc. user-pull, server-pull, etc. certificates, tickets, PACs, etc.

84

85 Server-Pull Architecture

Server-Pull Architecture

Client

Server

User-role Authorization Server

85

86 User-Pull Architecture

User-Pull Architecture

Client

Server

User-role Authorization Server

86

87 Proxy-Based Architecture

Proxy-Based Architecture

Client

Proxy Server

Server

User-role Authorization Server

87

88 RBAC Mechanisms

RBAC Mechanisms

RBAC can be implemented using Secure cookies: user-pull architecture X.509 certificates: user-pull or server-pull architectures

88

89 Other RBAC Research and Results

Other RBAC Research and Results

90 RBAC Research (dates are approximate)

RBAC Research (dates are approximate)

The early NIST model: Ferraiolo et al 1992 onwards Role-Graph Model: Osborn et al 1994 onwards OASIS model and architecture: Moody et al 1994 onwards Trust Management: Herzberg, Li, Winsborough, et al 1996 onwards Temporal RBAC: Bertino et al 1998 onwards Constraint languages: Ahn and Sandhu, 2000 Delegation in RBAC: Barka, Sandhu, Ahn et al 2000 onwards RBAC and workflow systems: Atluri, Sandhu, Ahn, Park et al 1998 onwards RBAC administration: Kern, Sandhu, Oh, Moffett et al 1998 onwards RBAC engineering: Thomsen, Kern, Epstein, Sandhu et al 2000 onwards Context-aware RBAC: Covington et al, 2000 onwards Rule-based RBAC: Al-Khatani and Sandhu, 2002 onwards ………………….

90

91 Ongoing and Future Work in RBAC

Ongoing and Future Work in RBAC

92 Research Challenges

Research Challenges

Automated RBAC RBAC engineering Formal models for RBAC Analysis of RBAC policies Integration with attribute-based access control RBAC in pervasive and ad hoc environments Cross-domain RBAC ………….

92

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